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Globalization, Privatization, and a Feminist Public
SUSAN H. WILLIAMS

The central claim in Professor Zillah Eisenstein's article' is that the
process of globalization is leading to increasing privatization, and that
privatization, in turn, contributes to substantial suffering for women around the
world. Eisenstein suggests, however, that feminism may offer some hope for
a revitalization of the realm of the public as a basis for resisting this trend
toward privatization. I will pursue this suggestion in several stages. First, I
will trace out three of the different manifestations of privatization that
Eisenstein mentions. Second, I will consider the feminist criticisms of existing
conceptions of the public and the related concepts of the State and citizenship.
Third, I will briefly offer the outlines of a new vision of the public. Finally,
I will explore the ways that a feminist revisioning of the public might address
the criticisms of the old version of the public and also help ameliorate the
privatizing impact of globalization.
"Globalization" is the process through which forces and actors that
transcend national boundaries shape life and law within nations.2
Transnational corporations are one of the prime movers of globalization, but
they are hardly alone. Globalization is also driven by economic forces other
than transnational corporations (e.g., the interrelationship of monetary
systems) and noneconomic forces that cross national boundaries (e.g., the
destruction of the environment or the transmission of diseases). I think it
would be fruitful to consider a feminist assessment of these other forces of
globalization, but Eisenstein's argument focuses on the particular impact of
transnational business enterprises and the technology that makes them
possible. Consequently, I will use the term "globalization" in Eisenstein's
qualified way.
Eisenstein mentions at least three forms of privatization that are
encouraged or enforced by this process of globalization. First, there is what
might be called economic privatization. Economic privatization is the

*

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.

1. Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving Publicnessfrom the Privatization
of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1996).
2. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction, I IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-2 (1993); Jost Delbrilck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and MarketsImplicationsfor Domestic Law-A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
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abdication of public responsibility for the economic welfare of the people
within a nation. Eisenstein points to recent moves to deregulate workplaces
and to cut back on welfare programs-including medical coverage for the poor
and elderly and vaccinations for poor children-as examples of this
"elimination of public responsibility." 3 Economic privatization is caused by
the fact that "[t]ransnational capital needs privatization of multiple publics."4
It is, of course, inconvenient for transnational corporations to deal with a
variety of different regulatory and administrative systems in the different
countries in which they operate. More importantly, the corporations can
choose to locate their operations where they are least likely to be hindered by
regulations, thus generating a race to the bottom: countries must compete for
corporate capital by reducing regulations that serve the welfare of their people
in order to pander to the economic interests of the corporations.'
The second type of privatization might be called political privatization.6
The increasingly global scope of issues, forces, and institutions affecting
people's lives leads to a decrease in the importance of the local and national
political arenas in which they exercise citizenship. People respond to this
change by focusing more of their attention on the individual material
consumption made possible by global markets and less of their attention on the
construction of a collective social world. In other words, globalization
encourages people to see themselves as private consumers rather than as public
citizens."
Finally, Eisenstein makes a very interesting argument about how the forces
of globalization have led to the privatization of feminism itself. Western
feminism becomes yet another product for export to the world. The effect of
this mass marketing is to reduce feminism to "a caricature of sex equality and
victimhood."' Victimhood becomes privatized and individualized, as in the
fascination with violence against women in the media, where the violence is

3. Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 61.
4. Id at 63.
5. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
TransnationalLabor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 989 (1995).
6. Although the argument made in this paragraph is not explicit in Eisenstein's paper, her many
references to the role of government and citizenship indicate that it is one concern underlying her objections
to globalization. See Eisenstein, supranote 1,at 62-63.
7. Some contemporary observers have argued that many of the forces of modern life, including but
not limited to globalization, have a similar effect. Cf MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 20008 (1996) (arguing that the increasing scale and complexity of life at the start of the twentieth century led
to "the loss of a public realm within which men and women could deliberate about their common destiny").
8. Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 69.
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completely disconnected from systematic gender subordination.9 Sexual
equality becomes privatized and consumerized, as in the use of "beautiful,
healthy, fashionable women" to represent the freedom of the West in
advertising.'0
In her article, Eisenstein argues that all three of these forms of
privatization are particularly harmful to women. With regard to economic
privatization, women are "the cheapest of the cheap workers," and they work
long hours for unbelievably little pay."
Moreover, this oppressive
employment is combined with a lack or loss of State support for women's roles
in both the market and the domestic sphere.12 In other words, the economic
privatization that has attended globalization has a particularly harmful effect
3

on women.'
Political privatization also imposes a distinctive harm on women. It is
only very recently that women have had any voice in political decisionmaking,
and they remain largely silent in many parts of the world. It is ironic that just
as women are beginning to demand and exercise political power, politics is
coming to be seen as irrelevant and impotent. 4
Finally, the privatization and mass marketing of feminism is also
particularly damaging to women. Anything that robs feminism of its critical
and radically disruptive potential is a loss to women suffering under various
forms of gender oppression. In addition, this distorted and washed-out version
of Western feminism becomes an easy target for antifeminists around the
globe 5 and a difficult and unappealing ally for feminists in the South and
East. 6 The fragmentation of women that results is also harmful to the longterm hopes of women worldwide.

9. Id at 74-75.
10. Id. at69.
11. Id. at 67-68.
12. Id at 68.
13. This effect may be exacerbated for women because of their preexisting economic vulnerability.
Women and children are disproportionately represented among the poor of the world, and the process of
globalization relies upon and often exaggerates the gendered division of labor that is used to justify and
perpetuate this inequality. See Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 68. In other words, gender and poverty are
related but independent reasons for the particularly harsh impact of economic globalization on women.
14. There is an interesting analogue in the recent move to destabilize the concept of the "self' in
postmodern philosophy. Just as women and other traditionally excluded groups are beginning to claim that
they are "selves," entitled to the modernist panoply of rights and powers traditionally enjoyed only by white
men, postmodernists are arguing that such "selves" are incoherent and irrelevant. See JANE FLAX, THINKING
FRAGMENTs 220 (1990).

15.
16.

See Eisenstein, szupra note 1, at 74-75.
See id. at 78.
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In light of these damaging effects of privatization, it might be tempting to
suggest that women should return to some traditional notion of the public
realm that predates these powerful forces of globalization. Perhaps, even if we
cannot reverse globalization itself, we could reverse some of the privatization
that has accompanied it. Eisenstein suggests, however, that our goal should
be a new vision of the public rather than a return to some older conception. I
agree with this view, and I would like to offer a few arguments in support of
it.
First, the traditional conception of the public realm rests on a contrast
between public and private which has been the subject of extensive feminist
criticism. 7 There are two common conceptions of the public and both have
been the target of such criticism. First, public sometimes refers to everything
but the family, so that workplaces and voluntary organizations count as
public. 8 This vision of the public rests on and institutionalizes the sexual
division of labor in which women are associated with the private sphere--even
when they are allowed (or even encouraged) to enter public realms like
employment. 9 This association of women with private life is then used to
justify the inequalities and lack of liberty that women experience as natural,
inevitable, and unrelated to the public social realm in which notions of justice
apply. 0
In the second common usage, public refers to the State, thus all
nongovernmental entities, like workplaces and voluntary associations, are
private." In that case, the private realm is conceived as the arena of free and
voluntary choice, as opposed to the public realm in which government
coercion operates.'
Feminists have pointed out, however, that women's
experiences in this private realm have often been oppressive and exploitative.

17. See generally Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/PrivateDistinction,45 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1992); Frances Olsen, ConstitutionalLaw: FeministCritiques of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 10 CONST.
COMM. 319 (1993).
18. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY 20 (1989); see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 44, 50 (1690) (Thomas

P. Peardon, ed. 1952); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, in THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU 8, 9
(Lowell Bair trans., 1974).
19.

See PATEMAN, supranote 18, at 118-120.

20. See Gavison, spra note 17, at 22. For a related objection arguing that children cannot
effectively be taught a sense ofjustice in such an unjust family, see SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER,
AND THE FAMILY 14-22 (1989).
21. See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING

STRUCTURES INPUBLIC POLICY (1977).
22. See Gavison, supranote 17, at 5.
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Consider spousal abuse, marital rape, and lack of reproductive control in the
family.' In other words, both of the traditional conceptions of the public fail
to account for women's experiences and contribute to gender hierarchy.'
The feminist difficulties with the traditional view of the public do not end
with this rejection of the common versions of the public/private distinction.
Feminists have also argued that the categories of the State and citizenship-both of which are integral to the traditional view of the public-are at best
problematic from a feminist perspective.
The "State" raises both pragmatic and theoretical difficulties for some
feminists. The pragmatic concerns revolve around the issue of whether
feminists should work through the State to seek reforms. Many feminists have
worked long and hard, with varying degrees of success in different countries,
to use the apparatus of the State to help women and promote gender equality.
Nonetheless, these efforts have met with serious criticism from other feminists.
According to Anne Curthoys, "A common thread in these more negative
assessments is that feminist apparent successes have involved an increase in
the powers of the state in individual lives, a decrease in family and collective
power, and a giving of benefits to white, middle-class women rather than to
women as a whole." 5 In addition, these reforms tend to be limited to very
specific areas of government policy such as child care, health services, and
social welfare. Feminist bureaucrats or ideas rarely have an impact on
government policy on issues like foreign affairs, trade, defense, or financial
6
policy.
Some feminists go a step further and argue that, from a theoretical
perspective, even the conceptual category of the State is not useful to
feminism. Judith Allen, for example, has argued that the State does not well
serve either of its most common roles in feminist theory. First, the State is
inadequate as a heuristic for male power because male power is more
omnipresent and interstitial than this conceptualization would suggest.
Second, the State is not usefully conceived of as a collection of locations for
feminist struggle, because those locations (i.e. police, bureaucracy) are too

23. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD AFEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191-92 (1989).
24. For a more complete account and critique of these models of the public sphere, see Susan
Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 1997).
25. Ann Curthoys, Feminism, Citizenship and National Identity, FEMINtST REV., Summer 1993, at
19, 31; see also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Antigone's Daughters, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE 61
(Wendy McElroy ed., 1982).
26. See Curthoys, supranote 25, at 31.
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diverse to be lumped together. Instead, each should be seen as part of the
larger cultural phenomena to which it connects.27
Another line of feminist criticism points out that the nation-state, as a
concept, has often rested on both real gender oppression and symbolic gender
imagery. For example, women "often come to symbolize the national
collectivity, its roots, its spirit, its national project."28 In many places, women
are given primary responsibility for transmitting culture in the form of
customs, songs, food, and language.29 And, of course, the social control of
women's reproductive capacity is used to ensure the production of "national
stock" for nations concerned about racial or ethnic purity.3" Thus, there are
powerful feminist arguments suggesting that the State is of neither practical
nor theoretical use to feminists.
The concept of citizenship has also been subjected to serious criticism by
feminists. In particular, feminists have objected to the liberal view of
citizenship as "something like equal membership in an economic and social
sphere ...less a collective, political activity than an individual, economic
activity--the right to pursue one's interests without hindrance in the
marketplace."'" Many feminists argue that this Western liberal conception of
citizenship "is derived from a set of values, experiences, modes of discourse,
rituals, and practices that both explicitly and implicitly privileges men and the
'masculine' and excludes women and the 'female."' 32 They also worry that
this individualistic and privatistic image of citizenship robs us of the sense of
politics as the striving of interrelated people to create a shared and
substantively valued social world.33
In light of these difficulties with the existing conception of the public
realm-and the related concepts of State and citizenship-the feminist response
to harmful privatization must provide a new vision of the public. I suggest that
the vision should be based on a commitment to shared responsibility for the
reality we inhabit, responsibility that is exercised through participatory,
democratic mechanisms. This notion of the public would make it, not a realm,

27. See Judith Allen, Does Feminism Need a Theory of The State'?, in PLAYING THE STATE:
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS 21 (Sophie Watson ed., 1990).
28. Nira Yuval-Davis, Genderand Nation, 16 ETHNIc AND RACIAL STUD. 621, 627 (1993).
29.
30.
31.
at 1, 5.
32.
33.

Id
See id at 628-30.
Mary G. Dietz, Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship, DAEDALUS, Fall 1987,
Kathleen B. Jones, Citizenshipin a Woman-Friendly Polity, 15 SIGNS 781, 781 (1990).
Dietz, supra note 31, at 12.
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but an orientation, a way of addressing or approaching issues. The public
would not be defined in contrast to the private, but rather in contrast to the
self-regarding, the irresponsible, or the nondemocratic.
This vision of the public responds to the feminist criticism raised earlier.
First, this vision of the public does not depend upon the usefulness of the State,
in eitler a practical or conceptual sense. The public would not be limited to
the State; many other social institutions could operate as mechanisms of
democratic, shared responsibility. For example, workplaces can and should
provide frameworks for participation in shared responsibility. Thus, this
vision of the public is workable regardless of how one resolves the feminist
criticisms of the State.34
Second, this conception of the public provides for a more meaningful
vision of citizenship. Citizenship would be broadened to include all forms of
participation in such shared responsibility. This broader conception of
citizenship could then function as the vehicle for pursuing a substantive vision
of the good society rather than merely as the freedom to pursue one's own
good. I do not mean to denigrate the freedom to pursue one's own vision of
the good, even if others disagree. Indeed, I believe that this orientation toward
one's own good is an excellent redefinition of the private, a concept that is as
much in need of revision as the public and that is also, I would argue, central
to the construction of a full human life. The focus of this paper, however, is
on reclaiming the public. The meaning of citizenship, in my revised version
of the public, answers the feminist criticisms of citizenship raised earlier.
Finally, this notion of the public also stands in a less problematic, although
perhaps more complex, relation to the family. Families would neither be
clearly within nor clearly outside this understanding of the public. Because
they will often operate in a nondemocratic fashion, families will often qualify
as nonpublic-but that may not always be the case. Families can be one of the
most powerful forms of shared responsibility and can, at least in some
instances, function in a participatory and relatively democratic way. A family
that met this standard would not be barred from the label public simply
because it was a family.
Consideration of families raises two important points about this new
conception of the public. First, the question whether any particular form of
social organization is public in this sense is not a question that one can answer
in the abstract. It is, instead, a question that requires close attention to the

34.

See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
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particular details of a given social arrangement. One cannot speak of "the
family" as public or not; one must talk about specific cultural and personal
contexts and relations. This contextual, particularized approach is consistent
with some of the widely shared commitments of feminists."
Second, a consideration of families leads inevitably to the conclusion that
this conception of the public will require greater attention to the meaning,
value, and nature of democracy. In order to determine whether any family is
sufficiently democratic to qualify as public, we need a robust sense of the
meaning of democracy and the value that it serves. While such an examination
of democratic theory is beyond the scope of this paper, I would suggest that it
is a strength of this vision of the public that it requires such an examination.
A conception of the public that is closely tied to the substantive value of
democracy promises to hold sufficient moral power to respond to some of the
crises of privatization that Eisenstein describes.
So, how might such a feminist revision of the public help us to deal with
the various forms of privatization outlined earlier?36 I think it is fairly clear
that a commitment to democratically exercised shared responsibility would
directly counteract the movement toward economic privatization. If we share
responsibility for each other, then we cannot abdicate control over the
economy at the cost of harming the most vulnerable in our populations.
Important questions and disagreements might remain, of course, about the best
mechanisms through which such responsibility should be exercised (i.e.,
government, business, voluntary associations) and about the most appropriate
or effective level of organization (i.e., local, state, national, regional,
international). The focus of the conversation would, however, shift to the
question of how best to take responsibility and away from the present
arguments over why we are justified in avoiding it.
Similarly, the concept of the public that I am proposing would provide
immediate resistance to what I have called political privatization. Accepting
a concept of the public as findamentally a matter of democratically shared
responsibility, and of citizenship as participation in such responsibility, is in
direct contradiction to viewing oneself as simply a private consumer. The
global scope of the problems to be addressed would still pose important

35.
(1990).
36.

See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1707
See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
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challenges, to be sure, but those difficulties would not alter the fundamental
obligations of public citizenship.
Perhaps the most interesting implications of this approach to the public
are, however, for the privatization of feminism itself. First, an orientation
toward shared responsibility should lead us to resist the depictions of women's
victimization as private and individual. We should search for the ways in
which broader social forces both cause the violence that women suffer and
could be used to combat that violence. Additionally, sexual equality would be
seen as a collective achievement, to the extent that it exists, and a collective
failure--which we share the responsibility to remedy--to the extent that it does
not. In other words, this vision of the public aspect of feminism would help
us to resist the privatization that Eisenstein describes.
Perhaps most importantly, a vision of feminism as itself a public,
characterized by democratically exercised shared responsibility, might help
women from different parts of the world come together. Such a vision would
emphasize that feminism is not a preexisting set of principles to which
newcomers must subscribe in order to join. It is, instead, a community of
women searching together, through participatory and respectfully democratic
mechanisms, for a shared vision of a good social life. Such a vision of
feminism does not require that we all agree on everything. What women in
one part of the world believe is a good life may be different from what women
in other places believe, and as Aihwa Ong points out in her paper," we must
accept and welcome these differences. But we can, I think, agree that this is
the conversation in which we as feminists are engaged and that, however
multiple our visions of the good life, we are committed to shared responsibility
for making those many visions a reality.

37. See Aihwa Ong, Strategic Sisterhood or Sisters in Solidarity? Questions of Communitarianism
and Citizenshipin Asia, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 107, 130 (1996).

